'Our memory includes events and experiences that took place factually, and events and experiences that did not. Together, the real and the imagined, the actual and the fantastic, construct the fabric of memory, or what we will call here the mnemic contexture. Importantly, both forms of memory are inseparable from our experience of reality, our inhabiting what phenomenologists call world or the lifeworld: the background structure that allows entities, relations and identities to become meaningful. ‘Unnoticed, presupposed, encompassing, world is always present, transparent and eluding every attempt to grasp it as object’ [...]. The lifeworld makes experience intelligible, but at the same time remains intangible. In this sense, the ‘world of actual experience’ is never reducible to the empirically validated, ‘objective world’. As French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty [...] puts it: ‘The real is a closely woven fabric. It does not await our judgment before incorporating the most surprising phenomena, or before rejecting the most plausible figments of our imagination.’ This world of actual experience subtends and exceeds empirical accounts and includes non-empirical elements such as latent potentialities, teloi and imagined states of affairs that, while they remain beyond empirical verification, are still very much part of the way we experience and respond to reality.
   Martin Heidegger [...] calls that which lends itself to empirical validation ‘factual’ (or ontic) and that which does not ‘factical’ (or existential-ontological):
Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s Being – one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The ‘that-it-is’ of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it. (emphasis in original)
Heidegger’s distinction is meant to call attention to the paucity of scientific–empirical accounts of reality in comparison to the richness of phenomenological accounts, and does not pertain directly to the mnemic contexture. However, it is still quite useful for expressing the epistemological status of mnemic components without recourse to terminology that poses the difference between real and imagined (sometimes understood as objective and subjective) as ontological hierarchy.'

Ohad Landesman and Roy Bendor, 'Animated Recollection and Spectatorial Experience in Waltz with Bashir', Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal 6.3

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